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THE METAPHYSICS OF PANDISPOSITIONALISM 
 
Matthew Tugby 
 
When referencing this paper, please use the final published version in 2012, 
Properties, Powers and Structures: Issues in the Metaphysics of Realism, Edited 
by Alexander Bird, Brian Ellis, and Howard Sankey (Routledge, pp. 1654179).  
 
Abstract:  In this paper I focus on the metaphysical view of natural properties known as 
pandispositionalism. After distinguishing two versions of pandispositionalism (dispositional 
monism and the twosided view), I argue that if one is a pandispositionalist, then one has 
special reasons for viewing properties as universals as opposed to (sets of) tropes. More 
precisely, properties should be seen as universals which are, at least in part, relationally 
constituted. I argue for this on the grounds that with universals in play, the 
pandispositionalists can successfully provide an account of the directedness of dispositions 
whilst at the same time respecting the fact that disposition instances are often intrinsic to 
their possessors and may exist even if they are never manifested. In contrast, it is less clear 
that ‘trope’ pandispositionalists can simultaneously account for these facts in a satisfactory 
way. I conclude the paper by focusing in more detail on the ‘universals’ version of 
pandispositionalism and consider the nature of the relations that, on this picture, hold 
between property universals. I suggest that these secondorder relations must be internal, but 
that the sense in which they are internal will vary depending on which version of 
pandispositionalism is adopted.  
 
1) Pandispositionalism 
 
In this paper I will focus on the metaphysical view about natural properties known as 
pandispositionalism. My aim is  to address some important metaphysical questions about 
the pandispositionalist picture, so that we may begin to understand how 
pandispositionalism is best understood. Before introducing these questions I must briefly 
outline the central claims of the pandispositionalism.    
 
During recent years, several philosophers, such as Ellis (2001), Martin (1993) and Molnar 
(2003), have advocated a metaphysical view which sees at least some natural, sparse 
properties as being irreducibly dispositional  (or ‘powerful’) in nature. According to this 
view, the nature of many (if not all) properties is determined, at least in part, by the 
causal abilities that they bestow upon their possessors. Such a view sets itself against the 
previously dominant categoricalist views about properties according to which   properties 
are essentially inert qualities whose natures are  independent of facts about causality. 
According to categoricalist views, such as those of Armstrong (1997) and Lewis (2009), 
properties bestow causal roles merely contingently. 
 
Now, it is a striking feature of dispositions that their natures are determined by what they 
are dispositions for, i.e., by the manifestation property towards which they are directed. 
For example, to understand the nature of charge, which is a paradigmatically 
dispositional property, one must know how charged particles behave in certain 
circumstances (e.g., they accelerate when placed in a forcefield). Pandispositionalism is 
the strongest form of dispositionalism, for on this view all natural  properties (and 
relations)  are irreducibly dispositional in nature. The pandispositionalist is thereby 
committed to a holistic metaphysics in which all properties ‘form an interconnected web’ 
(Mumford, 2004:182). It is holistic in the sense that the nature of a given property will be 
determined, at least in part, by its directedness towards a further property, but given that 
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this further property will be irreducibly dispositional in nature, its identity will also be 
fixed by the manifestation property towards which it is directed  (and so on). 
 
Before introducing the questions that I want to  address with respect to 
pandispositionalism, it should be pointed out that pandispositionalism comes in slightly 
different forms. This is a point that is often not  acknowledged. Pandispositionalism is 
often closely associated with dispositional monism, but these two views are not 
equivalent. According to dispositional monism, the nature of each and every property is 
exhausted by its dispositional characteristics (see, for example, Bird (2007a) and Mumford 
(2004)). Whilst dispositional monism clearly entails pandispositionalism, 
pandispositionalism does not entail dispositional monism. One could consistently 
maintain that each and every property has an irreducible dispositional nature, and thereby 
sign up to pandispositionalism, without claiming that all there is to a property is its 
dispositional characteristics. Such a position seems to have been occupied by C.B. 
Martin, when putting forward his ‘twosided’ view (1993). According to the twosided 
view, all properties have a categorical (or ‘qualitative’) aspect to them, but at the same 
time they also have  an irreducible dispositional nature. Such a view is therefore 
pandispositionalist in spirit, and so falls under the scope of this paper , along with 
dispositional monism.      
 
 
2) The aims of this paper 
 
During this paper I will assume the pandispositionalist picture and begin by addressing 
the question whether properties are best understood as universals or (sets of) tropes. 
After briefly introducing the distinction between tropes and universals, I will approach 
the tropes versus universals debate by considering whether and how each of these  views 
about properties are able to accommodate and explain certain salient features of 
irreducible dispositionality. More precisely, I will claim that any satisfactory version of 
pandispositionalism must provide an account of the directedness of dispositions, whilst 
accommodating the fact that many (if not all) dispositions are intrinsic to their possessors 
and also the related fact that a disposition instance may exist unmanifested.  
 
I will begin by considering how the ‘universals’ version of pandispositionalism is able to 
accommodate these important facts, before examining ‘trope’ versions of 
pandispositionalism. My conclusion will be that a theory of universals is able to provide a 
more coherent and transparent account of these central features of irreducibly 
dispositional properties. This does not, of course, mean that the ‘universals’ 
pandispositionalist is entitled to declare an immediate victory, since as is well known, the 
tropes versus universals debate may be contested on a variety of grounds. What I will 
argue, however, is that if one signs up to pandispositionalism, then one has special 
reasons for favouring a universals account, reasons that, at the very least, put the onus of 
proof on those seeking to establish a trope version of pandispositionalism. Whether 
these reasons can  be trumped on other grounds is a question I leave open.  
 
The ‘universals’ version of pandispositionalism to be recommended is one that sees 
universals as being, at least in part, relationally constituted. On this view, disposition 
universals are internally related, and it is in virtue of such relations that a disposition’s 
directedness is what it is. Such relations are what Bird calls ‘secondorder manifestation 
relations’ (2007b). I will conclude this paper by briefly considering  the nature of such 
relations. 
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Before beginning the argument, it should  be pointed out that although I am framing the 
tropes versus universals debate in terms of pandispositionalism, the reasons put forward 
in favour of a universals account should appeal equally to those who, whilst allowing a 
place in their ontology for irreducible dispositionality, do not claim that all properties 
(and relations) are irreducibly dispositional. Ellis (2001) and Molnar (2003) are two such 
philosophers. 
 
Finally, it should also be noted that whilst I will be recommending a universals account 
of dispositionality, I will not address here the question whether disposition universals are 
best understood in the Aristotelian ‘immanent’ sense, or the Platonic ‘transcendent’ 
sense.1. Unfortunately, that question must  be reserved for another day.  
 
3) The tropes versus universals debate 
 
Those who hold there to be a distinct ontological category of natural properties (and 
relations) typically view those properties (and relations) as either universals or as (sets of) 
tropes. An initial way of capturing the difference between universals and tropes is to say 
that universals can exist in many places at the same time, whereas tropes cannot. Thus, if 
properties are universals, then all objects that exemplify, say, a particular determinate 
shade of red may be said to share an identical property; the very same property is 
exemplified by all of those objects. On this view, a property is an entity that can spread 
itself across many concrete particulars. In contrast, according to the trope theory, each 
instance of a property is distinct, which is to say that properties are nonrepeatables. On 
this view,  each property instance is itself a particular, although since property instances 
cannot exist apart from their possessors, they are  classed as abstract particulars. On the 
trope view, then, the claim that a group of distinct objects share the same determinate 
property should, strictly speaking, be understood as the claim that those objects each 
possess distinct  property instances which resemble exactly.  
 
Which view of properties should the pandispositionalist favour? As suggested earier, one 
way of choosing between these alternatives is to consider which of these views offers the 
best resources for accommodating certain salient facts about irreducible dispositions. 
The facts about dispositions I will focus on concern  the directedness of dispositions, the 
intrinsicality of many (if not all) dispositions, and the related fact that an instance of a 
disposition may exist unmanifested. At first glance, these facts  appear to be at odds with 
each other, but with universals in play, one can, I argue, accommodate these facts in a 
coherent and transparent way. In contrast, it is less clear that a trope pandispositionalist  
can simultaneously accommodate these facts in a satisfactory way.  
 
4) Three facts about irreducible dispositionality 
 
Directedness 
 
Firstly, as mentioned already, it is a fact about dispositions that they are in some sense 
connected with, or ‘directed towards’, that which they are dispositions for, i.e., their 
manifestation property. This is a key fact, for as we saw earlier, it is in virtue of such 
                                                 
1
 According to the immanent view, universals wholly exist in the spacetime realm, in each of the 
particulars which instantiate them (they exist in rebus). In contrast, according to the transcendent view, 
universals (or ‘Platonic forms’) exist in a realm of being outside of space and time (they exist ante rem).  
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directedness that the identity of a disposition is fixed. To know the nature of charge, for 
example, is to know what outcomes being charged is orientated towards.  
 
Intrinsicality 
 
The second important fact about dispositions is that disposition instances may be 
intrinsic to their possessors. Defining the term ‘intrinsic’ in a precise way is no easy 
matter (see, for example, Langton and Lewis (1998)). However, a roughandready 
definition capturing our main intuition about intrinsicness is all we need for our 
purposes. Our main intuition seems to be that a property P is an intrinsic property of x if 
and only if x’s having P is independent of the existence of distinct entities and x’s 
relation to them. Do any dispositional properties satisfy this definition? It seems that 
they do. The negative charge possessed by, say, an electron is surely a feature that it has 
independently of the situation external to the electron. If a particle is negatively charged, 
it would remain charged even if put in very different circumstances (unless, of course, the 
particle itself was to be changed in some way).  
 
It should be pointed out that some philosophers have argued that there are  dispositions 
which are not intrinsic, but extrinsic. McKitrick (2003), for example, cites weight as one 
such example. If a person is moved from one planet to another, their weight may change, 
even if the person remains qualitatively identical. This suggests that the dispositional 
property of having a certain weight is an extrinsic one. It seems clear enough, however, 
that not all dispositional properties are of this kind. When we come to explain why a 
person’s weight would be different if they lived on a different planet, we inevitably appeal 
to properties that do seem to be intrinsic. To understand weight, for example, is to 
understand that it  is a function of the person’s mass and of the magnitude of the 
gravitational field generated by the planet’s mass. In contrast to weight, mass is plausibly 
an intrinsic dispositional property, because no matter where a massive object is located, it 
will have the same set of gravitational abilities. It seems, therefore, that intrinsic 
dispositions cannot be eliminated. As Molnar puts it, ‘[S]uch is the resilience of the 
intrinsic’ (2003: 107). 
 
Given that weight can be explained by the mass of a person along with the gravitational 
field in which they find themselves, one may suspect that having a certain weight is really 
no addition of being, and that such a ‘property’ can  be explained away. This is Molnar’s 
suspicion (2003: 108110), although  McKitrick has a number of responses to this line of 
argument (2003). This debate need not concern us here, however. The important point is 
that at least some dispositions are wholly intrinsic to their possessors. 
 
Existence unmanifested. 
 
The third fact about irreducible dispositionality to be considered, which is related to the 
intrinsicality fact, is that an instance of a disposition may exist even if it is never 
manifested. Acceptance of this fact is central to the realist view about  dispositions. 
According to the realist view,  dispositions are properties in their own right and so exist  
even if they are not being displayed. Whilst the manifestation of a disposition is potential 
only, the disposition itself is actual. Given that this is so, the fragility of a particular vase, 
for example, would be ascribable to it even if the vase never comes to be broken. 
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5) The challenge of accommodating the three facts 
 
There is, I suggest, a prima facie tension between these three facts. Specifically, there is 
tension between the first fact, about directedness, and both the second and third facts, 
which concern intrinsicality and existence unmanifested. This tension is revealed as soon 
as we consider how one might go about accounting for the directedness of irreducible 
dispositions. 
 
U.T. Place once remarked that when characterizing  the directedness of a disposition ‘… 
we are characterizing it in terms of its ‘relation’ to something…’ (1999: 226). This quote 
suggests an obvious way of accounting for the connection between a disposition and its 
manifestation. Such an account would ground t the directedness of a disposition towards 
its manifestation in a genuine relation. This does seem the obvious way to go. When we 
say, for example, that the thigh bone is connected to the knee bone, what we ultimately 
mean is that the thigh bone bears a certain relation to the knee bone. 
 
The first problem with this idea, however, is that since the nature of  irreducible 
dispositionality consists in nothing more than directedness, disposition instances would 
become purely relational features of the world. This result is at odds with our second 
fact, that many disposition instances are intrinsic (i.e. monadic). If we take dispositions to 
be purely relational entities, it seems, at first glance, that the intrinsicality fact is 
compromised. If, on the other hand, the relational account of directedness is rejected, so 
that the intrinsicality fact may be preserved, we are left in the dark with regard to what 
dispositional directedness consists in. 
 
The second problem is that the relational view of directedness also seems at odds with 
the third fact, that a disposition may exist unmanifested. This is a worry that Place is well 
aware of. It is noticeable in the quote above that Place uses inverted commas when 
speaking of there being a ‘relation’ between a disposition and that which it is a 
disposition for. This suggests he holds some scepticism about the idea, and the reason  is 
that it seems to compromise our third fact, that a disposition instance may exist even 
though its manifestation never occurs. This is because, intuitively, in order for a relation 
to exist, its relata must also exist. But in the case of an unmanifested disposition, one of 
the relata in question is missing, since the manifestation towards which the disposition is 
orientated never occurs. This is what some have called the Meinongian problem (see, for 
example, Armstrong, 1997: 79)2. If fact three is upheld, the relational account of 
directedness is in trouble, unless one is prepared to take the radical step of accepting 
relations which lack relata. Alternatively, one could  simply reject the relational view of 
directedness, but then we are once again left in the dark with regard to what dispositional 
directedness consists in.  
 
In sum, then, the challenge the pandispositionalist faces is that of  providing a theory 
about dispositions which can account for  directedness in an intelligible way whilst at the 
same time preserving the fact many dispositions may be instantiated  intrinsically and 
may also exist unmanifested. I will now argue that if the pandispositionalist views 
properties as universals, this challenge can be met straightforwardly. 
 
 
                                                 
2
 This objection is socalled because, famously, in a debate with Russell about reference, Meinong appeared 
to advocate the reification of nonexistent entities. 
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6) Universals to the rescue 
 
With universals in play, one has the option of cashing out the directedness of 
dispositions in a relational way, by appealing to second order manifestation relations holding 
between the disposition universal and the universal(s) corresponding to its 
manifestation(s)3. If one is a pandispositionalist, this  relation will  be seen to constitute, 
at least in part, the nature of the universals related. This means the secondorder relation, 
which grounds directedness, must be internal in some sense4. If such a relation were not 
internal, but rather external, then properties would only have their dispositional 
characteristics contingently. This would clearly go against the tenets of 
pandispositionalism and would leave us with a view of dispositions closer to that of 
Armstrong5.  Now, with these secondorder internal ‘manifestation’ relations in play, the 
pandispositionalist is able to preserve the intuition, mentioned earlier, that when we 
speak of there being some connection between a disposition and its manifestation 
property, we mean that they are related in a certain way. But how, on this picture, can 
facts about intrinsicality and existence unmanifested be satisfactorily accommodated?  
 
Once directedness is viewed in terms of relations amongst universals, the following 
moves become available. With respect to the  second fact, that many disposition 
instances are had intrinsically, the universals theorist can assert  that the internal relations 
which determine a disposition’s nature exist merely at the secondorder level of universals. 
This kind of relation is to be distinguished from what we may call  firstorder relations, 
which hold between particulars rather than the universals themselves. By appealing to 
this distinction within the theory of universals, the pandispositionalist can allow that a 
particular may instantiate a property intrinsically, even though the property type is 
relationally constituted at the  level of universals6. In other words, although disposition 
instances at the firstorder level may be said to be intrinsic to their possessors, the 
connection between a  disposition and its manifestation property is nevertheless 
maintained due to the relations holding between the  universals themselves. 
 
What about the third fact concerning the existence of unmanifested? Again, using 
distinctions within the theory of universals,  one can accommodate this third fact without 
losing the connectedness that a disposition has  its manifestation. Whilst the 
manifestation of a disposition instance possessed by a particular need never come into 
existence, the manifestation type can still  exist at the level of universals. This allows us 
to say that dispositions are not directed towards particular  manifestations which may not 
exist. Rather, directedness is secured by a relation to the  manifestation kind. Ellis was 
arguably the first to emphasise the importance of this idea7. It gets around the 
Meinongian problem because, if like Ellis, one holds an immanent theory of universals, 
the generic kind towards which a dispositional  property is directed will automatically 
exist ‘if something, somewhere, at some time, has an effect of this generic kind’ (2001: 
133). And if one holds a transcendent view of universals, then the existence of the kind 
towards which a dispositional property is directed is automatically guaranteed, because 
                                                 
3 This kind of view has been suggested both by Bird (2007a) and Mumford (2004). 
4
 The sense in which such a relation may be said to be internal will be addressed in detail towards the end 
of this paper. 
5
 Armstrong calls the contingent secondorder relations that bestow dispositional characteristicsrelations of 
nomological necessity, or ‘N’ relations (see 1997, ch. 15 &16). 
6 Bird (2007a: 141) also emphasises the importance  of clearly distinguishing the secondorder level of 
property universals with the firstorder level of particulars. 
7 Mumford has also  explored this way of responding to the Meinongian objection (2004: 11.7) 
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transcendent universals are plausibly necessary existents (see Bird, 2007a: 3.2.2). On 
either of these alternatives, then, it is easy to avoid the conclusion that dispositional 
directedness involves a relation to entities which often do not exist. This is made 
possible, in sum, by the idea that dispositional directedness secured by a relation to the 
relevant manifestation universals at the secondorder level.   
 
 
 
Now that I have outlined how the ‘universals’ pandispositionalist can relieve the prima 
facie tension that arises with respect to the three facts, without giving up the obvious way 
of  explaining the directedness of dispositions (in terms of genuine  relations), we will 
now see whether the trope pandispositionalist can do the same. I will argue that they 
cannot.  
 
7) Heil’s trope account 
 
In contrast to pandispositionalists who adhere to a universals view, it is difficult for the 
trope theorists to swallow the claim that  dispositions are (at least in part) relationally 
constituted. . This is because, unlike the universals theorists, the trope theorists are 
unable to draw the distinction between property universals and property instances; for 
the trope theorist, there are only distinct property instances. Therefore, on the trope view, 
the relational constitution claim  amounts to the claim that all disposition instances are 
relationally constituted, and this seems to leave no room for ascribing dispositions to 
particulars which are purely intrinsic.  
 
Heil, as a pandispositionalist trope theorist, rightly sees that the rejection of the 
intrinsicality fact concerning dispositions  is unappealing. Aware of the danger of 
Meinongtype objections, Heil suggests that ‘[T]he existence of a disposition (trope) does 
not in any way depend on the disposition’s standing in a relation to its actual or possible 
manifestations …’ (2003: 83; words in parentheses  added for clarity). Later, Heil makes 
the same point in terms of truthmaking: ‘[T]he truthmaker for ‘this key would open a 
lock of kind K’ is not the key, possible lock of kind K, and a relation between the key and 
K’ (2003: 124). Rather, according to Heil, the powers are ‘built in’ to the intrinsic 
properties themselves: ‘[I]f the key ‘points beyond’ itself to locks of a particular sort, it 
does so in virtue of its intrinsic features’ (2003: 124). 
 
Given Heil’s penchant for the intrinsicality of dispositions, one might immediately think 
that  this compromises the directedness thesis concerning dispositions. But as is clear in 
the latter quote,  this is something that Heil certainly does not wish to do, for he rightly 
sees that the directedness thesis is at the heart of pandispositionalism. This is made clear, 
for example, when Heil claims that a powerful thing (a key, in this instance) ‘points 
beyond’ itself to its manifestation, and is ‘ready to go’ (2003: 124). The problem is , 
however,  that if directedness is not cashed out in terms of relations, it is far from clear 
what account one can then give  of dispositional directedness. What, precisely, are the 
ontological grounds of dispositional  directedness? This question becomes especially 
pressing when we recall the fact that dispositions may exist unmanifested. What, 
precisely, does it mean to say that an object with an unmanifested disposition trope 
‘points beyond’ itself? Without further elucidation, the ‘pointing beyond’ claim seems to 
be  a mere vague metaphor. 
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Heil does not appear to  give any further account of dispositional directedness and how 
such directedness is possible. Yet, such an account is  needed, for it is surely a reasonable 
question to ask what makes a particular trope directed towards one manifestation rather 
than another. Simply saying that dispositional directedness is ‘built in’ to the intrinsic 
properties themselves does not shed much light on the matter, for the question at hand is 
how, precisely, an intrinsic physical property could indeed ‘point beyond’ itself to 
something that may not exist.  
 
It is at this point that the universals account of dispositions is seen to have a distinct 
advantage over Heil’s trope view, for it is able to  give the ‘pointing beyond’ claim 
ontological backing in a way that Heil’s does not.. , This deficiency is also not  peculiar to 
Heil’s version of the trope view. Martin, another trope pandispositionalist, faces the same 
problems. Like Heil, Martin maintains that dispositions are not relational, on the grounds 
that ‘[T]he readiness of something’s disposition for all of this may fully exist although its 
disposition partners and mutual manifestations do not’ (2008: 6). If one is a trope 
theorist, this does indeed seem like the sensible conclusion to draw, but then what 
metaphysical account can be given of the directedness of dispositions? Again, this is not 
a question that Martin takes seriously enough. Martin merely tries to  capture 
dispositional directedness using an array of metaphors and gestures: he speaks of 
‘dispositional readiness’ (2008: 23), the ‘wouldhavebeenif’ of dispositions (2008: 2), the 
‘what for’ of dispositionality (2008: 4), the ‘ready to go (2008: 2) of dispositions, and 
dispositional ‘selectiveness’ (2008:7). The result is that the precise nature of dispositional 
directedness remains rather  opaque. 
 
8) Molnar’s intentionality view 
 
Unlike Martin and Heil, Molnar is one trope theorist  who takes more seriously the need 
to provide an account of the metaphysical source of dispositional directedness8. Molnar 
accepts that disposition tropes are not relational, and, following U.T. Place (1996), uses 
the notion of intentionality to account for the ‘directedness’ of disposition  tropes 
(Molnar, 2003: 61)9. Molnar identifies four main features that most contemporary 
philosophers take mental intentionality to have, and then argues that each of these 
features are ones  that dispositional states, or ‘powers’, also have (2003: 6366). Briefly, 
the four features are: i) internal reference to, or ‘directedness’ towards, an (intentional) 
object; ii) the intentional object may not exist; iii) the intentional object may be 
indeterminate in some respects; iv) the truth of a description of an intentional state need 
not be preserved under substitution of coreferring expressions.  
 
It should be pointed out  that several arguments have been provided in recent 
philosophical literature attempting to show that Molnar’s account fails on the grounds 
that dispositionality differs in several crucial respects from mental intentionality10. I need 
                                                 
8
 Note that, unlike Heil and Martin, Molnar is not strictly speaking a pandispositionalist. He comes pretty 
close, however, because he takes all but spatial properties to be irreducibly powerful (see Molnar, 2003).  
9 See also Martin & Pfeifer (1986) who suggest that intentionality as traditionally conceived is not peculiar 
to the mental. 
10 Bird, for example, argues that the truth of statements concerning a disposition’s manifestation is always 
preserved under substitution of  coreferring terms (2007a: 123). Furthermore, Bird questions Molnar’s 
claim that dispositions are directed towards indeterminate manifestations, and also suggests two further 
features of intentionality which dispositional directedness does not share  (see Bird, 2007a: 118126). These 
features are the extrinsicness of intentional states, and the feature that the object of a thought is often the 
cause of that thought. See also Mumford (1999) for further criticisms of the intentionality account of 
dispositionality. 
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not rehearse those arguments here, however. Even if Molnar is correct, and dispositional 
directedness does share the main features  of mental intentionality, it remains far from 
clear that Molnar’s account of dispositional directedness is significantly  more transparent 
than that offered by Heil or Martin. To begin with, Molnar’s aim is not to provide an 
account of the nature of intentionality, but instead to merely point out that dispositional 
directedness is  the same kind of directedness as that found in the mental intentional 
case, whatever that may be. This becomes clear when Molnar indicates that the concept 
of intentionality is, on his account, taken simply to be a primitive (2003: 81).  
 
In Molnar’s defence, one might think that he does go at least some way towards 
alleviating the apparent tension between dispositional directedness and the fact that, for 
example, disposition tropes may exist unmanifested. Perhaps Molnar’s point is simply 
that we  do not have any qualms about accepting directedness towards nonexistent 
objects in the mental intentional case, and so why should we feel uneasy in the physical 
case? Even if, as seems to be the case, there are problems surrounding mental intentional 
directedness, these are problems we already have in philosophy and so viewing physical 
dispositional states as intentional states does not bring any new problems to the table.   
   
In response, it has to be said that this kind of response seems to avoid the questions at 
hand rather than tackle them. For example, Molnar’s intentionality claim  does not in 
itself settle the important issue of  whether dispositional directedness consists in a 
genuine relation. In one place, however, Molnar does indicate that intentional 
directedness should not be thought to consist in a genuine relation; he writes that ‘the 
nexus between the intentional state and the object to which it refers is not that of a genuine 
relation’ (2003:62) A ‘pseudorelation’ would therefore seem to be a better label for 
dispositional directedness. The problem with this concession, however, is that Molnar’s 
account of dispositional directedness becomes very similar to Heil’s. The only difference 
is that where Heil speaks of dispositions pointing beyond themselves, Molnar speaks of 
dispositions being intentionally directed. On either account, we are left with a picture in 
which disposition tropes reach out in a rather mysterious way to their nonexistent 
manifestations. 
 
A route that some trope theorists might consider taking is to reject the ‘pointing beyond’ 
metaphor, and claim that the directedness of an unmanifested disposition trope is rooted 
in facts about how that trope resembles other tropes that have manifested in a certain 
way. This move comes with its own  host of problems, however. To begin with, if facts 
about what a trope is a disposition for are not determined by the nature of the trope itself, 
but, rather, is inherited via resemblances to  other things, it is hard to see in what sense 
that trope can  be said to be in itself powerful. Further puzzling questions can also be 
raised about the resembling tropes which have manifested. What fixes their directedness, 
which is to say what fixes their identity as dispositions, prior to them being manifested? 
This strategy would create more difficulties than it solves. The directedness must, as Heil 
maintains, be ‘built in’ to the disposition tropes themselves, as difficult as  that claim is to 
cash out.  
 
Now I have argued that trope versions of pandispositionalism are at a significant 
disadvantage as compared with the universals account, I will conclude with some further 
comments concerning the details of the ‘universals’ account of irreducible 
dispositionality. In particular, I will focus on questions concerning the nature of the 
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secondorder manifestation relations which, on this view, account for the directedness 
(and so the identity) of dispositions. 
 
9) The nature of second4order manifestation relations 
I now want to briefly explore  what it means to say that a relation – a secondorder one 
in this case – is internal. We will see that there is more than one sense in which a relation 
can be internal. It will then be suggested that the sense of internality appropriate to the 
twosided version of pandispositionalism, mentioned earlier, may be slightly different to 
the sense of internality appropriate to the dispositional monist version of 
pandispositionalism.  
 
Famously, the notion of an internal relation, and the extent to which the world contains 
such relations, was strongly debated by British philosophers during the early part of the 
20th century. Bradley, an idealist, says of an internal relation that it ‘... must at both ends 
affect, and pass into, the being of its terms’ (1893: 364). Joachim makes an equally 
elaborate comment when he writes that internal relations ‘qualify or modify or make a 
difference to the terms between which they hold’ (1906: 12).  
 
Russell tries to sum up what is common to all accounts of internal relations with the 
claim that internal relations (i.e. all relations, according to the British idealists), are 
‘grounded in the natures of the related terms’ (1910: 160). This expression is itself 
somewhat vague, however, and Russell confesses to be uncertain about precisely how the 
expression ‘natures of the related terms’ is best understood in this context. In discussing 
this issue, Moore offers two possible interpretations: either internal relations are 
grounded merely in the numerical identity of the terms themselves, or, more specifically, 
they are grounded in the ‘qualities’ the terms have, independently of their ‘relational 
properties’ (1919; 62). The crucial difference seems to be that, on the second view, 
essential reference is made to the intrinsic, qualitative natures of the things internally 
related, whereas on the first interpretation, internal relations are said merely to make a 
numerical difference to the terms related. 
 
In fact, Moore thinks that, generally, those who speak of internal relations understand 
them in the second, stronger sense. It seems, however, that one could commit to the 
view that internal relations make a difference to the numerical identity of their terms, 
without committing to the further claim that those internal relations are grounded in the 
intrinsic qualities of their terms. In discussing the first, weaker formulation of internality, 
Moore specifies it in a precise form, using the symbolism of Russell and Whitehead’s 
Principia Mathematica: ‘The assertion with regard to a particular term A and a particular 
relational property φ, which A actually has, that φ is internal to A means then: (x) ¬ φx . 
entails . x ≠ A.’ (1919: 54) In words, this states that if some object does not bear 
relational property φ, then that entity cannot be identical to A (given that φ is internal to 
A). This claim is also logically equivalent to the rather minimal claim that if x is identical 
to A, then x must bear relational property φ (given that φ is internal to A), i.e.: (x) x = A . 
entails . φx (1919: 54). 
 
The question relevant for us is as follows. Are the pandispositionalists’ secondorder 
relations amongst universals internal in the weaker sense just described? The answer is 
clearly yes. It follows from Moore’s definitions that A could not exist in any possible 
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world without bearing relational feature φ (given that φ is internal to A). In other words, 
A bears relational property φ necessarily. This is, as we have seen, precisely the kind of 
claim that the pandispositionalists must endorse with respect to property universals. If 
the pandispositionalists were to deny that secondorder manifestation relations amongst 
universals hold necessarily, thereby accepting contingency, they would ultimately be 
committing to the claim that properties are in and of themselves inert and categorical. 
On such a view, if a certain property were to bring any power at all to a world, it would 
do so only because a certain contingent relation (or relations) amongst universals happened 
to hold. The properties themselves would not be essentially or irreducibly powerful. As 
mentioned earlier, this would leave one with a view closer to that of Armstrong (1997), 
which is clearly not a pandispositionalist view.  
 
It seems, therefore, that at the very least, the pandispositionalists must accept the 
internality of (secondorder) manifestation relations in the weaker sense defined by 
Moore. Recall, however, that a stronger sense of internality was also outlined. On the 
stronger interpretation, a relation is said to be internal if it is grounded specifically in the 
‘qualities’ of its terms. In other words, if A bears relational property φ, and φ is internal in 
this sense, then if some entity x does not bear φ, then not only is x not identical to A, but 
x must be qualitatively different to A.  
 
An important question, then, is this: are the secondorder manifestation relations posited 
by the pandispositionalists internal in this stronger sense? In order to answer this 
question, one must ask whether it  makes sense for a pandispositionalist to speak of 
universals being qualitative. As was briefly indicated earlier, according to one version of 
pandispositionalism it does seem to make sense to speak in this way, whereas according 
to the other main version, it does not. 
 
At the beginning of this paper  two versions of pandispositionalism were distinguished: 
dispositional monism and the twosided view. According to dispositional monism, the 
natures of all properties are exhausted by their dispositional characteristics, which  means 
on the universals view under consideration that they are exhausted by their secondorder 
manifestation relations. Thus, on this view, property universals are wholly relationally 
constituted, and so such universals can have no ‘qualities’ which help to  ground the 
secondorder manifestation relations11. Therefore, if one advocates dispositional monism, 
secondorder manifestations can only be internal in the weaker sense defined by Moore, 
which does not make reference to the qualities of the terms  related. 
 
The case is  somewhat different with respect to the twosided version of 
pandispositionalism. It is at this point that the main difference between the twosided 
                                                 
11
 The coherence of the thought that an entity may be wholly relationally constituted has been questioned 
by, for example, Heil (see 2003: 102105 where Heil discusses Dipert’s relationalist view about particulars 
(1997), which is the firstorder analogue of the dispositional monists’ view about properties). Roughly, the 
objection is that if the ‘relata’ have no intrinsic features, then there is ultimately nothing there for the 
relations to relate, and so the picture collapses into nothingness. If this objection is fair, then this suggests 
the twosided version of pandispositionalism is preferable to dispositional monism. It should be noted, 
however, that many philosophers argue, against Heil, that it is  coherent to posit relata that have no 
features other than the relations they enter in to. In order to avoid losing the relata, there merely has to be 
a mutual ontological dependence between the relata and relations, which means both that relata do not 
exist independently of their relations and that the relations do not exist independently of their relata. This 
is the kind of view maintained by moderate structural realists; for further discussion of this kind of position 
see Esfeld and Lam (2008). 
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view and dispositional monism can once again  be seen. According to the twosided 
view, all properties have both an irreducibly dispositional aspect and a categorical (or 
‘qualitative') aspect. According to the view advocated in this paper, the dispositional 
characteristics associated with properties are best understood as being rooted in second
order ‘manifestation’ relations amongst property universals. But  unlike dispositional 
characteristics, the qualitative aspects that twosided theorists speak of  are not rooted in 
relations amongst universals, because unlike dispositionality, categorical features do not 
consist  in directedness towards other properties.  
 
Thus, if one is a twosided theorist, there are indeed  qualitative aspects to properties 
which could potentially  groundthe internal relations between universals in some sense. 
In order for there to be such grounding, it would have to be the case that if a ‘twosided’ 
universal bears a certain internal relation (i.e. internal in the strong sense under 
consideration), then if a another universal does not bear such a relation, it must have a 
different qualitative side to the universal in question. In other words, there would have to  
be a necessary connection between a property’s ‘qualitative’ side and its dispositional 
characteristics.  
 
It should be highlighted, however, that in one placeMartin, a twosided theorist, 
oddlyleaves open the possibility that the dispositional aspects and categorical aspects of a 
property may be merely contingently related (1996: 87). If they were contingently related, 
then manifestation relations would clearly not be internal in the sense under 
consideration. Martin’s allowance of contingency has been heavily criticised, however. As 
Mumford highlights when discussing Armstrong’s dislike of the twosided view (2007: 
85), if the categorical aspects of the world and the dispositional aspects of the world 
really could exist apart, then the Martintype position would look more like a version of 
property dualism12, in which case it would no longer be a version of pandispositionalism. 
To avoid this problem, the twosided pandispositionalist has to consider secondorder 
manifestation relations to be internal in the stronger sense outlined by Moore, which is to 
say that qualitative aspects and dispositional characteristics must be seen to be necessarily 
related. Not only would some universal x fail to be identical to universal A by lacking a 
certain manifestation relation which A bears,  if it did lack such a relation, then 
necessarily x would also bear a different qualitative aspect. 
 
Finally, a further way of expressing the difference between the twosided view and 
dispositional monismis as follows. Armstrong has often characterised internal relations as 
‘ontological free lunches’ in the sense that once their relata, with all their qualitative 
features, exist, the relations are automatically there: they supervene upon their relata and 
so are ‘no addition of being’ (1997: 12). An example of an ontological free lunch in this 
context is the resemblance relation: given the intrinsic natures of two objects, the nature 
of their resemblance is automatically fixed. It can now be seen, then, that speaking of 
secondorder manifestation relations as ‘ontological free lunches’ is more appropriate in 
the case of the twosided view than the dispositional monist view. If, as the dispositional 
monist maintains, secondorder manifestation relations are what wholly constitute the 
nature of property universals, it would be  inappropriate to class those relationsas 
‘ontological free lunches’. One can hardly say that such relations supervene upon the 
prior natures of the universals, because they simply have no prior natures13. On the 
dispositional monist picture, therefore, internal secondorder manifestation relations are 
                                                 
12
 Place (1996) and Prior (1985) are two prominent figures who hold there to be both categorical and 
dispositional properties. 
13
 This point has been emphasised by Barker in a recent discussion of dispositional monism (2009). 
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quite different to many kinds of internal relation that philosophers speak of, such as the 
resemblance relation. Unlike the dispositional monists’ internal manifestation relations, it 
would be  strange to claim that the internal resemblance relations an entity bears to 
others constitute the entity in question. All of this suggests that when Armstrong speaks of 
internal relations as ‘ontological free lunches’, he has in mind those relations which 
satisfy the stronger definition of internality, discussed by Moore, which makes essential 
reference to the intrinsic qualities of the related terms. 
 
10) Summary 
 
In this paper I have argued that if one is a pandispositionalist, one has special reasons for 
viewing properties as universals. More precisely, they will be universals which are, at least 
in part, relationally constituted. I have argued for this on the grounds that with universals 
in play, the pandispositionalist can satisfactorily account for the directedness of 
dispositions whilst at the same time respecting the fact that disposition instances are 
often intrinsic to their possessors and may exist even if their particular manifestations 
never come about. In contrast, it is less clear that a trope pandispositionalist can 
simultaneously account for all of these facts in an adequate way. Finally, I briefly 
discussed the sense in which the pandispositionalists’ secondorder manifestation 
relations are internal on the universals view, and suggested that the internal relations to 
be utilised in the  dispositional monist version of ‘universals’ pandispositionalism are  
slightly different to those which will figure in the ‘twosided’ version. 
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